Where the Pacing Problem Becomes Visible
A new report on MPs’ offices in the UK shows how the gap between expectations and capacity plays out in the everyday work of representation
BY BEATRIZ REY
When I read the recently launched Democracy on Default Settings report, I felt both happy and relieved to see someone taking on a task that is surprisingly rare: understanding how legislative offices actually function in practice. Not in theory, not in institutional design debates, but in the day-to-day reality of how representation is delivered. What POPVOX Foundation has been calling the “pacing problem” — the widening gap between the rapid evolution of technology and democratic institutions’ ability to understand, adopt, regulate, and oversee it — appears here in grounded, practical terms. This report shows how that gap is experienced operationally inside MPs’ offices, where limited capacity, fragmented systems, and weak organizational support make adaptation difficult.
Written by Hannah O’Rourke, Director of Campaign Lab, and Edward Saperia, Dean and Founder of Newspeak House, the study focuses on the UK, but its diagnosis travels well beyond Westminster. This is partly because it emerges from a deliberately grounded approach. As Hannah explains, “having worked in MPs’ offices, I’ve seen firsthand how these systems operate and how difficult it can be to navigate them. That was part of the motivation for the report: to get under the surface of how offices actually function, by observing workflows and speaking directly with the people who work within them.” That choice matters, because what the report uncovers is not a failure of individuals, but a failure of systems.
Hannah O’Rourke, Director of Campaign Lab, and Edward Saperia, Dean and Founder of Newspeak House, authors of Democracy on Default Settings
Across 650 MPs’ offices — effectively small, under-supported organizations — the same patterns recur:
unclear strategic direction, with nearly half of staff reporting no well-defined goals,
MPs expected to act as managers without training or support,
minimal onboarding and limited feedback,
highly uneven organizational structures that prevent learning across offices,
intense workloads combined with weak or nonexistent workflows,
significant portions of staffing budgets left unused even as offices struggle,
a fragmented technology landscape with hundreds of uncoordinated tools,
narrow recruitment pipelines and low pay that undermine professionalization,
high turnover that erodes institutional memory, and
widespread stress and burnout.
The system functions, but largely because staff compensate for these gaps through individual effort rather than because the underlying structures support them.
Although the evidence comes from the UK, the underlying dynamics are familiar across legislatures. So much so that, after reading the report, I found myself suggesting to colleagues in Brazil that they undertake a similar exercise. Hannah is explicit about this broader relevance: “the key thing is to undertake this kind of exercise in your own parliament. It starts with listening, really trying to understand what people are doing day to day, and talking to the people who are having to live with this.” And the stakes go beyond organizational efficiency. As she notes, “we know there’s a collapse in trust in democracy across the world. Trust is built through small, repeated interactions, and how people experience their interaction with representatives shapes how they perceive the state.” Edward extends the point further, suggesting that this is an area ripe for cross-national learning: “there would be scope for an international network focused on this. Representative offices are similar enough across countries that a lot of lessons could be shared.”
What makes this report particularly valuable for those of us working on parliamentary modernization is that it shifts attention to a layer that is both central and neglected. These are not grand institutional reforms. As Edward noted in our conversation, many of the proposed changes are operational rather than political. But precisely for that reason, they have been overlooked. If the pacing problem reflects institutions struggling to keep up with rapid technological change, then MPs’ offices are where that challenge becomes visible—and where, arguably, some of the most tractable solutions lie.
For broader context, see the latest from the POPVOX Foundation on how the pacing problem is affecting legislatures across the world.
Beatriz: Your report discusses parliamentary offices operating without clear strategic direction. Is this a problem of the institution or a consequence of how the Members themselves understand their role?
Hannah: It’s probably a bit of both. Technology has likely changed what it means to be a representative, particularly in the UK context. We have a very old political system, and with advances in different forms of democracy — and in the relationship between representatives and citizens — there is a core uncertainty about what an MP should be today and what their role entails.
As the report shows, MPs do many things: casework, policy work, and at times even community organizing. The role encompasses a wide range of functions, and it’s not always clear which role they are playing at any given moment. That points to a broader, still-emerging question in our research: what is the purpose of an MP in the modern age? We didn’t fully confront that question, but it’s one that political systems more generally need to consider as governance continues to evolve.
So part of this is a systems issue, that is, a consequence of large-scale changes in politics and institutional arrangements. At the same time, there is also a lack of direction from MPs in how they lead their staff. Once objectives are clear, it becomes possible to build systems, workflows, and processes around them. Without that clarity, it is much harder to develop tools, establish routines, or even accumulate institutional learning.
In that sense, some of the challenge lies with MPs themselves, in setting direction and recognizing the organizational implications of not doing so. But there is also a larger structural question that, to be fair, modern democracies have not yet fully reckoned with. So yes, it’s a bit of both.
Beatriz: When you say we are unsure about the role of MPs in the modern era, there are several dimensions to that. First, the internet has already changed a lot, and now we have AI. Do you think it’s going to become harder and harder to achieve that clarity? Will we ever reach it?
Hannah: I think we can have clarity if we actively ask those questions and think about how things might evolve. Different forms of technology now allow us to aggregate preferences at scale, which can be very useful for democracy. But in the UK, we have a representative system where you elect someone and trust their judgment to represent you. With these new capabilities, the balance between representative and more direct forms of democracy may need to shift.
So I don’t think things will necessarily become clearer on their own. These are, in many ways, old problems. Societies go through periods of change, and political systems have to adapt as new questions emerge. Part of the challenge is having the willingness to confront those questions rather than avoid them. Ed, would you like to add anything?
Edward: In some sense, you can think of this as a failure of imagination. An MP’s office is, at its core, a person with a budget, and what it becomes is largely up to them. It could, for example, function primarily as a kind of publishing organization or take on many other forms. The type of incoming it receives will depend on how it presents itself.
The problem is that MPs often arrive and are immediately overwhelmed. Suddenly, they are dealing with hundreds of emails a day and default to trying to respond as best they can, just to stay afloat. From their perspective, they are also rarely in the office. They have statutory duties (voting, for instance) which take up significant time, and there is also the expectation that they should be “doing politics.” So they hire staff, ask them to keep things under control, and check in occasionally.
Ideally, MPs would approach this more strategically. But they tend to operate from a mindset of scarcity: there is more incoming than they can manage, so they simply do their best. With the right design and operational structure, that does not have to be the case. Three hundred emails a day is unmanageable if you lack systems, but it is not inherently unmanageable if you have them.
Another factor is how MPs understand the role of their office in shaping how they are perceived. Some may assume that citizens primarily perceive the party, so what matters is their engagement within it. But if they see the office as a key instrument of representation — both reactively, in responding to constituents, and proactively, in defining who they are and what they stand for — then its role becomes much more significant. The office can invite engagement, shape responses, and project a clear identity, particularly within the constituency.
The issue is that most MPs do not fully take up that opportunity. They hire staff and ask them to respond to emails as best they can, without a broader strategic vision. This is a missed opportunity because, while these offices are not large-scale organizations, they are not insignificant either. There are organizations operating at similar scales that do this work strategically. Managing an office effectively is a skill, and it should be treated as such. Many MPs simply do not have a clear sense of what a well-run office looks like, so they settle for what seems “good enough.”
Beatriz: You’re talking about offices, and one of the findings I found particularly interesting is the extreme variation across them. What do you think about the trade-off between flexibility, which allows Members to build their teams, and standardization, which could improve capacity and learning?
Hannah: Yes, that tension between flexibility and standardization is very real. If you think strategically, you want flexibility in proactive activities, since each MP may have a different vision for what they want to achieve. But when it comes to reactive work, standardization in workflows, processes, and supporting technology can make the whole system more efficient.
So it’s not really an either-or question. It depends on what you’re focusing on: incoming work or proactive activity. Ideally, systems should be designed to create space for more creative and flexible work by optimizing efficiency on the reactive side. The tension is real, but the answer depends on what you’re trying to do and what enables you to do it more effectively.
Edward: I would frame this in terms of professionalization. When people hear this word, they often think of hiring someone with a specific skill to perform a task. But in reality, it refers to building an ecosystem.
That means developing best practices that are significantly more effective than the absence of them. It also means having access to specialists who can come into an office for a defined period to carry out specific tasks — people whose roles, costs, and contributions are well understood. More broadly, it means that job roles become meaningful. Without professionalization, titles don’t carry much weight. You hire someone and ask them to do something without a clear benchmark for performance.
With professional standards, you can identify a problem and address it more reliably. It’s the difference between knowing you need a dentist when your teeth hurt, versus asking a neighbor to try to fix the issue. Professionals bring tools, knowledge, and benchmarks.
Right now, one of the core challenges is that many people working in MPs’ offices enter these roles because they want to be in politics, but do not see them as long-term careers. They often take these roles as an entry point into politics, do their best, and move on quickly. That’s not how other professions operate. You don’t become a doctor for the experience and then leave. You stay to become a good doctor. There’s no inherent reason why parliamentary offices couldn’t develop along similar lines.
Hannah: To build on that point about structure versus flexibility, it’s worth noting that you can enable a great deal of innovation and flexible thinking by creating the right infrastructure — whether for testing, knowledge management, or analytics. For example, introducing some structure in how data is gathered, how insights are identified, and how learning is stored can actually make it easier to do more flexible, innovative, and interesting work. So when we talk about structure and flexibility, they are often not in opposition. They reinforce each other. From an organizational perspective, this is key. Once you have a feedback mechanism in place, you can experiment, evaluate what is working and what isn’t, and adapt accordingly.
Edward: Right. Fundamentally, strategy means making choices. And I think the problem is that, much of the time, those choices aren’t made. Offices end up being driven by incoming demand rather than by a clear strategy.
Beatriz: That makes sense. You mentioned that many people enter these roles as a pathway into politics rather than as long-term careers, but the levels of stress and turnover you describe are quite severe. So these are not especially welcoming or sustainable work environments. Do you think this is inevitable? Do all offices have to function this way, or is this something that can be addressed through better organization?
Edward: Stress is closely tied to expectations. The key question is: what output are we expecting, and are we adequately set up to deliver it? Think of a salesperson. Their stress depends on their target. If they’re expected to sell a million units a day, they’ll be under constant pressure; if the target is one a year, they’ll be relaxed. In that sense, much of this comes down to how expectations are set.
In many offices, the implicit message is simply “do your best,” with the added risk that if something goes wrong, there will be consequences. That creates stress, especially given the political risks involved. But these dynamics can be managed. In many cases, what we’re seeing is fundamentally a problem of poor management, which generates unnecessary pressure.
Hannah: Building on that, I also worked in politics — first as a caseworker and then as a parliamentary assistant. One of the motivations for writing this report was precisely this perspective. Many of the people we spoke to are doing their absolute best, but they are operating within systems that seem to work against them. There’s no way to make work more efficient if the systems themselves don’t support what you’re trying to do.
So you have people working extremely hard under difficult conditions, facing constant pressure, but without the tools or structures needed to improve how the work is done. Some of these issues are internal to individual offices; others relate to the Parliamentary Digital Service and its constraints; and others still are institutional. That’s what makes this such a complex problem: there is no single point of failure. It’s the cumulative effect of multiple factors that produce a dysfunctional operational environment.
This is not primarily about individual shortcomings. It’s about people working against a constant influx of demands without the tools to manage them effectively. And this matters, especially in a context where democracy is under strain. For many citizens, their interaction with an MP’s office is their most direct experience of the state. If someone loses access to benefits and relies on their MP to intervene, that interaction becomes their perception of how the state functions. Yet, we underinvest in this key interface between citizens and power.
This is an area that receives too little attention, despite the fact that people within it are working incredibly hard. Targeted, system-level interventions could make a substantial difference. Our report focuses on what different actors can do. For example, what the Parliamentary Digital Service could improve. That includes clearer procurement practices, setting default recommendations, and opening up competition in areas like casework software, where there is currently a single provider that may not meet users’ needs. Some of these changes could be implemented relatively quickly. But more broadly, our goal was to bring attention to a problem that remains underexamined.
Edward: You also can’t ignore the role of technology. Many productivity gains come from technological improvements, and in many ways we are in a moment of significant opportunity on that front. There is an entire industry developing around these tools, and this is not limited to a single office or even a single country. There are multiple contexts in which similar work is being done. Given that, the idea that staff should simply sit in front of an overflowing inbox and do their best is not realistic.
Beatriz: I agree. You mentioned procurement difficulties, and the report points to a highly fragmented use of digital tools. I take it this is both a governance problem and a lack of strategy.
Edward: Correct.
Beatriz: My first question is whether you see potential for AI to address some of the limitations identified in the report, across different levels. And, in the UK context, how would you approach adopting such tools given the governance challenges and lack of strategic coordination in digital infrastructure?
Hannah: AI definitely has the potential to transform workflows and improve productivity. But its adoption needs to be properly governed: data must be handled responsibly, systems must be secure, and we need to preserve the relational, human aspects of representation.
You wouldn’t want a situation where all casework is handled by AI. But you could use AI to support tasks like identifying relevant briefings or structuring information, which would free up caseworkers to focus on direct, often sensitive interactions with constituents — many of whom approach MPs in moments of crisis. The goal should be to use AI to enhance capacity, not to replace the human dimension of representation.
There are many potential applications: improving efficiency, identifying workflow bottlenecks, or generating insights from data that currently go unmeasured. But governance and ethics are critical. At the same time, trust in political systems is already fragile, so maintaining meaningful human contact is essential. AI should help create space for that, not erode it.
On the broader issue of the tools landscape, an ideal scenario would involve a clear technical infrastructure that still allows for innovation at the office level. That could include interoperable systems, default recommendations, or even coordinated procurement. For example, negotiating access to commonly used tools at scale. Alternatively, a more open market approach could work, provided there are clear standards that tools must meet before being adopted.
Many industries have already addressed similar challenges. The key is to create incentives for experimentation and innovation. Citizens should expect more from political systems, and meeting that expectation requires both operational improvements and the willingness to test new approaches.
Edward: I work in this area, so I’m very familiar with the complexities and risks involved. One issue is that “AI” is often used as a catch-all term, but in many ways it’s just another type of technology. Like any technology, it has strengths, limitations, and implementation challenges. Those are, fundamentally, questions of design and governance.
The difficulty is that people often have strong emotional reactions to AI, which makes it harder to have a grounded discussion. But, as with anything, there are effective ways to use it and ineffective ones. Asking whether AI should be used in the public sector is, in a sense, the wrong question. The more relevant question is how to use it appropriately. Rejecting it outright is not especially constructive. It’s a technology that is already here and will continue to evolve.
It is also a powerful tool. It enables capabilities that were not previously possible, even as it continues to develop rapidly. The surrounding ecosystem — products, applications, use cases — is advancing quickly, with new innovations emerging constantly. In that context, MP offices should be treated like any other institution: they need to adapt to the technological environment.
For resource-constrained settings like parliamentary offices or nonprofits, this represents a significant opportunity. Well-deployed technology can substantially expand what these organizations are able to do. Ignoring that potential is a mistake. Part of the problem is that these institutions are often not seen as strategically important, so there is limited awareness of what they do or how much they could improve.
If they were taken more seriously, they could evolve like any other organizational system: adapting, improving, and becoming more effective over time. The issue right now is that they are largely overlooked. And, like any underexamined system, they risk stagnating and gradually deteriorating.
Hannah: On the AI point, there is also a broader responsibility for civic institutions and nonprofits to help shape how this technology is adopted and used in society. There is an obligation to engage. Ignoring it is not a viable option, because new technologies are always shaped by the actors who actively participate in their development and deployment. So the question becomes: how can AI be used to benefit society, strengthen civil society, and improve democratic systems? If these institutions step back, then private companies will largely determine the answers. That’s why engagement matters. Not engaging is, in many ways, the greatest risk.
Beatriz: You have many recommendations that require action from multiple actors — Parliament itself, digital services, parties, MPs. Where do you see the strongest and weakest points for change? Which of these actors will be easier or harder to convince?
Edward: It’s ultimately a political question. Some changes are clearly easier than others, but which organizations are willing to act is harder to determine. From my perspective, increasing pay for staff to more market-appropriate levels is one of the more straightforward changes. And, in fact, it already seems to be happening, with recent announcements that go beyond the scope of our report.
What I would really like to see is a serious reconsideration of technology procurement processes. I understand the tendency toward caution — especially around cybersecurity — but this is a professional organization, and it should be able to manage those risks. Other organizations face similar constraints and still adopt modern systems. With increased scrutiny, there is an opportunity for Parliament to update its approach and move toward something more contemporary.
By contrast, it’s difficult to expect MPs themselves to drive these changes. This is not typically within their skill set, and they face multiple competing demands, often under significant political pressure. These issues are unlikely to be a top priority. That said, the people working in MPs’ offices, as well as the institutions tasked with supporting them, can still improve things incrementally over time.
We shouldn’t expect rapid transformation. But those whose core responsibility is to make these offices function effectively — including staff — are better positioned to push for progress. For actors for whom this is just one of many competing concerns, change will be slower.
Hannah: From a political perspective, the question of how change happens is essential. The goal is not just to produce a report, but to influence outcomes. One of the motivations behind this report came from earlier research conducted ahead of the 2024 UK general election. We anticipated a significant turnover of MPs and saw an opportunity to provide guidance to new members, encouraging them to think differently about how their offices operate.
Timing matters. Change is often more feasible during moments of transition. That was part of the logic behind this report: identifying a window of opportunity and working with people who are new to the system and potentially more open to alternative approaches.
Another pathway is drawing attention to an issue that has been neglected. Many of the problems described in the report are not the result of deliberate inaction, but of responsibility being diffused across multiple actors — they fall through institutional gaps. In such cases, visibility becomes crucial.
There is also growing bottom-up demand for change. Staff working in these offices face these constraints every day, and over time that generates pressure for improvement. We’ve received strong feedback from staffers who feel the report accurately reflects their experience. There are also emerging networks of staff trying to innovate, including efforts to push for the adoption of different tools and greater flexibility through the Parliamentary Digital Service.
This demand is particularly important in a moment of transition, with new offices that are not yet fully established and staff who are motivated to improve how things work. Systemic change often follows from sustained attention and collective demand.
At the same time, this is a complex problem. No single actor can solve it alone. Progress requires a shared commitment to engage with uncertainty — we don’t yet know what an MP’s office will look like in 10 or 20 years — and to work collaboratively toward better solutions. That, ultimately, is what we hope the report encourages: recognition that the problem is difficult, but solvable if it receives sustained attention.
Edward: We were initially concerned that staff might respond defensively saying they were already doing their best. But that wasn’t the case. The response has been overwhelmingly constructive: people recognize the systemic issues and welcome the analysis.
What’s encouraging is that many of the proposed changes are relatively manageable compared to other political challenges. Improving how offices function is not the same as passing major legislation. It’s more operational than political. We already invest significant resources in these systems, so reallocating or modestly increasing them is not unrealistic. Many of the changes are about improving processes, not redesigning the political system.
That’s why I’m optimistic. We didn’t write this report because the problem is intractable — quite the opposite. The main issue has been a lack of attention. Compared to larger national challenges, this hasn’t seemed like a priority. But with greater focus, there is substantial room for improvement, and many of these issues can be addressed in relatively straightforward ways.
Beatriz: My final question is: you mentioned that your findings resonated with MPs and staffers in the UK, but I think they go beyond that context. What should other parliaments take away from your diagnosis of how offices function on the ground?
Hannah: That’s a great question, and thank you for pointing to the broader relevance. I think one key takeaway is the importance of undertaking this kind of diagnostic exercise within each parliament. It starts with listening, that is, really trying to understand what people are doing on a day-to-day basis.
That perspective is also grounded in experience. Having worked in MPs’ offices, I’ve seen firsthand how these systems operate and how difficult it can be to navigate them. That was part of the motivation for the report: to get under the surface of how offices actually function, by observing workflows and speaking directly with the people who work within them.
Only then can you begin to identify what is not working at a systemic level. More broadly, I think this connects to a larger issue: declining trust in democracy. We often look for large-scale solutions to that problem, but in many cases trust is built through small, repeated interactions over time. How people experience their day-to-day interactions with representatives shapes how they perceive the state.
So there is value in focusing on what is concrete and actionable. Many of the changes we suggest are not radical, but they can have meaningful effects. I would encourage parliaments not to shy away from complexity. Rather, engage with it, listen to those inside the system, and recognize that improving these everyday interactions may help address larger democratic challenges.
And finally, technology should be seen as an opportunity. It is not something that simply happens to institutions. It is something they can actively shape.
Edward: I think there is also scope for building an international network around this issue. Representative offices across countries are similar enough that there is significant potential for shared learning. While each country has a limited number of such offices, globally there are hundreds of thousands. That scale could support the development of a real ecosystem.
This connects to professionalization and the emergence of service providers. For instance, high-quality software, training, and benchmarking — developed with an international perspective — could significantly improve how these offices function. While my experience is primarily with the UK, what we observed is not very different from what you see in many small nonprofits: people doing their best, but without strong organizational structures or efficiency.
The key difference is that these offices are far more consequential. They are not just another small organization. They are part of the machinery that produces laws, and laws have systemic effects. That makes it worth investing the effort to improve how they operate.
Beatriz: Thank you so much to both of you. I very much enjoy talking about people who care about legislative politics. This was great.
Modern Parliament (“ModParl”) is a newsletter from POPVOX Foundation that provides insights into the evolution of legislative institutions worldwide. Learn more and subscribe at modparl.substack.com.
